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Abstract—Understanding the dynamics of reciprocation is of
great interest in sociology and computational social science. The
recent growth of Massively Multi-player Online Games (MMOGs)
has provided unprecedented access to large-scale data which
enables us to study such complex human behavior in a more
systematic manner. In this paper, we consider three different
networks in the EverQuest2 game: chat, trade, and trust. The
chat network has the highest level of reciprocation (33%) because
there are essentially no barriers to it. The trade network has
a lower rate of reciprocation (27%) because it has the obvious
barrier of requiring more goods or money for exchange; morever,
there is no clear benefit to returning a trade link except in
terms of social connections. The trust network has the lowest
reciprocation (14%) because this equates to sharing certain
within-game assets such as weapons, and so there is a high
barrier for such connections because they require faith in the
players that are granted such high access. In general, we observe
that reciprocation rate is inversely related to the barrier level in
these networks. We also note that reciprocation has connections
across the heterogeneous networks. Our experiments indicate
that players make use of the medium-barrier reciprocations
to strengthen a relationship. We hypothesize that lower-barrier
interactions are an important component to predicting higher-
barrier ones. We verify our hypothesis using predictive models
for trust reciprocations using features from trade interactions.
Using the number of trades (both before and after the initial trust
link) boosts our ability to predict if the trust will be reciprocated
up to 11% with respect to the AUC. More generally, we see
strong correlations across the different networks and emphasize
that network dynamics, such as reciprocation, cannot be studied
in isolation on just a single type of connection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth in the amount and richness of on-
line interactions, through Massive Multi-player Online Games
(MMOGs) such as EverQuest1 and World of Warcraft2 are
creating social interaction data at an unprecedented scale.
These MMOGs help computer scientists and sociologists over-
come the key difficulty in studying the social dynamics and
human behavior by providing an experimental platform for
collecting data at high resolution and for long periods. These
virtual worlds provide a rich environment for studying user
interactions and have been used in several recent experimental
studies [1], [2], [3], [4].
The ages of the players of these games vary from 13 to
60 and more than 50% of the players are employed full-time3.
1https://www.everquest2.com/
2http://us.battle.net/wow/en/
3http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/gateway demographics.html
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Fig. 1: Comparing reciprocation prediction accuracy via AUC.
The figure shows that adding hetergeneous network features
(e.g. trade) boosts the prediciton accuracy by 11%.
They spend an average of 22 hours per week and 60% of them
reported playing 10 hours continuously3. In these games, all
user interactions, actions, and communications are recorded
in a log file. In this paper, we use one such MMOG called
Sony EverQuest II1, for analyzing the reciprocation of trust
relationship in heterogenous interaction networks, including
chat, trade, and trust relationships.
The dynamics of the reciprocation varies from network to
network depending on the level of barrier for reciprocation.
The barrier for reciprocating a trust relationship could be lack
of resources or high risk involved. Needless to say, these bar-
riers affect the levels of reciprocation significantly in different
networks. For instance, in a chat network users have very low
barrier level for trusting each other as there is no commitment
from either side to participate in any involved relationship or
potential loss. On the other hand, in a trust network players
grant access to each other’s housing resources. The barrier
level in the latter is very high. It is important to understand
questions related to reciprocation across different types of
interactions. For instance, do people reciprocate differently
for trust building activities compared to trust cancellations?
As mentioned earlier, understanding these questions in great
detail is possible because of the MMOG data.
The dynamics of complex network relationships cannot
be studied in isolation because low barrier interactions may
play a critical role in building the high barrier reciprocations.
Understanding such dynamics offers several key insights. For
instance, our experiments verify that players use low barrier
interactions, like trade, before reciprocating trust. We verify
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our hypothesis by building a predictive model for trust recip-
rocation; using features from the trade network boosts the AUC
by up to 11% as shown in Figure 1.
A. Contributions
The goal of this paper is to understand the dynamics of
reciprocation in the context of trust. Following are the key
contributions of this work:
• We explore the relationship between reciprocation and
different barriers for reciprocation in several interac-
tion networks. We establish that reciprocation rate is
inversely proportional to the barrier level.
• We analyze the temporal aspect of reciprocation and
show that the speed of reciprocation is also inversely
related to the barrier level.
• Our analysis on trust building and cancellation shows
that the trust building reciprocations occur more often
and more quickly.
• Reciprocation cannot be studied in isolation, and
hence we study the effects of reciprocation in the
presence of other interactions. We hypothesize that
players use low barrier interactions to establish initial
trust, followed by a high barrier reciprocation.
• We verify our hypothesis using predictive models
to find reciprocation links with behavioral features
from low barrier networks. Several highly predictive
features in general link prediction, such as age ho-
mophily [5], are not as effective as proposed heteroge-
nous network features that boost the AUC by up to
11%.
B. Related Work
The notion of reciprocation is well studied in sociology,
and, as defined by Gouldner [6], it is the norm of reciprocation
that people should help those who help them. Indirectly, if
you have helped someone then they have an obligation to help
you back. Following this notion, several studies analyze the
relationship between reciprocation and the human behavior
in various social networks, such as child care [7], social
altruism [8], and online communication [9]. Leider et al. [8]
use reciprocation as a means to study human behavior in social
altruism in terms of favors and gifting. They conclude, by
several online field experiments, that there is a 52% increase
in directed altruism towards friends compared to random
strangers. This number further increases by another 24% when
it leads to further prospects of receiving return favors or
gifts. Similar experiments were conducted by interviewing
families from different working groups to understand the child
care favors in social networks. Hansen [7] reveals that social
location and kinship improves reciprocation of interaction in
these networks. In another recent work [9], the Twitter reply
network is analyzed to understand reciprocation in relation to
user happiness, where the measure of happiness is computed
using sentiment analysis of text content exchanged in Twitter
messages. This work concludes that reciprocal behavior in
the Twitter reply network shows high assortativity in terms
of measured happiness of Twitter users. In all these works,
reciprocation is studied on hand picked user samples or surveys
[7], [8] or used to understand specific human behavioral aspect
such as happiness [9] or altruism [8].
There has been recent developments on developing graph
models using reciprocation as a model parameter. For in-
stance, Zlatic and Stefancic [10] develops a growing model
for Wikipedia using three key parameters: reciprocal edges,
degree, and size of modeled network. They empirically eval-
uate that the generated network closely matches the in- and
out-degree distribution of the actual Wikipedia. There are also
several papers that discuss the relationship between reciproca-
tion and other network parameters such as degree distribution.
Durak et al. [11] propose a null model for directed graphs that
combines the reciprocal and the one-way edges to generate
directed graphs that match the in-, out-, and reciprocal-degree
distributions. Ahmad et al. [12] use theories of social exchange
as a basis for building a generative model GTPA for modeling
temporally evolving directed networks.
There are other recent works, such as Gralaschelli and
Loffredo [13] that use statistical measures to conclude that
the reciprocation of a network is never at random and it is
either reciprocal or anti-reciprocal. They define a correlation
coefficient in terms of the average and the actual reciprocation.
When the correlation coefficient is positive and nonzero, it is
correlated, and when negative, it is anti-correlated. Similarly,
Zamora-Lopez et al. [14] propose a method to compute the
expected reciprocation of the network as a function of in-
and out-degree distributions and show empirically the expected
reciprocation closely matches the actual in several real-life
networks. reciprocation in weighted directed networks, es-
pecially in large scale mobile communication networks, is
discussed in [15], [16], . Akoglu et al. [15] propose a novel
triple power law (3PL) distribution that fits the reciprocation
behavior in several data sets and show interesting properties of
this distribution such as parsimony. The paper also concludes
that reciprocation is higher among users with more common
neighbors and larger degree correlation. Szell and Thurner
[4] study the strength of positive and negative ties in friend
and enemy networks and propose approximate social laws
relating betweenness centrality and communication strength to
the number of overlapping links. In another work Szell et al.
[17] show that negative interactions have a lower reciprocation
compared to the positive interactions.
Reciprocation has also been used for link prediction [18],
[19], [5]. Cheng et al. [18] study several attributes for pre-
dicting reciprocation in the Twitter network, such as relative
degree, absolute degree, and other link prediction features.
They use regression and decision tree classifiers to predict the
expected reciprocation and conclude that features that measure
the relative status of two nodes are the best predictors of
reciprocation. Zlatic and Stefancic [19] study how reciprocal
edges influence other properties of complex networks, such as
degree distribution and correlations. They present a statistical
inference technique to estimate the number of reciprocal edges.
In summary, all these related works address the following
class of problems: modeling a generative process incorporating
reciprocal edges, understanding the effect of reciprocation
on a particular human behavior, or using reciprocation-based
features in the task of link prediction. None of these papers
attempt to study multiple relational networks such as trade,
chat, etc. to understand the notion of reciprocation in trust re-
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Fig. 2: Degree distributions of trust, trade and chat networks.
lationship in heterogeneous networks, especially on large-scale
real-life networks such as MMOGs. Also, these models do not
use an evolving network scenario, where understanding the
behavior of reciprocation on the time dimension is extremely
important.
II. MMOG DATA SETS
The Sony EverQuest (EQ) II game provides an online envi-
ronment where multiple players can log in and coordinate with
each other to achieve a particular mission. Note that players
are free to invent, choose their mission and to self-organize
among groups of their own interest. The game provides several
mechanisms such as chat for instantaneously interaction. We
were provided with the game data set logs, and we extracted
the information needed for our experiments from these logs
for various interactions. In this section, we summarize each of
these networks in terms of the number of nodes and edges, the
period of observation, and the direction of edges. Also, some
networks such as trust are rich in terms of edge attributes, we
discuss them in more detail.
A. Trust Network
In EQ II, players form teams in order to complete the
game tasks. As the players are limited by the number of items
they can carry at a time, players buy houses as a temporary
storage to retain their armory and other accessories. Through
the trust network, players share their house access with other
players. For this reason, we also refer to this network as the
trust network. We have 9 months of data from Jan-01-2006 to
Sep-11-2006 with 63684 nodes and 140514 edges. Each node
in the network is a player character in the game, and each edge
is a permission granted or removed by the character to another
character. Each edge has a time stamp when the access was
granted or removed. In addition, each edge also has a trust
level: Trustee, Visitor, Friend, None, and Remove. The Trustee
access is the highest level of trust, whereas Remove is the
lowest level of trust the player can express towards another
player. The number of edges of the network by trust level is
summarized in Table I and each trust level is described as
follows.
• Trustee: Player can store, touch, move, add, and re-
move things, and has almost same access as the owner.
• Friend: Player can store, touch, and move things.
• Visitor: Player can enter the house and view things.
• None: Player can see the house externally but cannot
enter it.
TABLE I: Number of edges by each trust level.
Trust Level Description Count
4 Trustee 82498
3 Friend 30850
2 Visitor 10928
1 None 4336
0 Remove 11902
• Remove: Permission granted to the player is revoked
and the house is visible only when the player is near-
by.
B. Trade Network
In the EQ II trade network, players exchange goods for
coins or goods. Players trade multiple items and coins with
other players by initiating a trade offer. A typical offer includes
items/coins offered, and items/coins needed in exchange. The
player offered can either accept or reject the trade request
instantaneously. If the request is accepted, then a trade link
is established between the seller (initiator) and the buyer
(acceptor) in the trade network. We analyzed such a trade
network containing 295,055 nodes and 11,913,994 edges over
a period of 9 months from Jan-01-2006 and Sep-11-2006. The
trust needed to establish a trade relationship is much lower
than housing, as the period of interaction is short and the risk
involved is nill.
C. Chat Network
The chat network is a communication medium where
players exchange instant messages. This network is directed
and the direction of an edge is from the sender to the receiver.
As the number of chat messages between two players is quite
high, and there is no associated session details, we assume
all the chat messages in a single day correspond to a single
session. The number of nodes in this network is 349,654, and
the number of edges is 86,948,748, spanning over a period of
one month from Jul-29-2006 to Sep-10-2006.
D. Network Profiles
We present the degree distribution of these networks in
Figure 2. The distributions were constructed using snapshots
of different networks over the entire observation period and we
considered multiple interactions between a pair of players for
this plot. The distributions seem to follow the power law with
exponent of the power law ranging from 1 to 3. The exponent
was calculated using the slope of a least squares fit in the log-
log plot. Now, we look in to the much detail of these networks
TABLE II: Statistics of reciprocation in trade, chat and trust networks. The forward edge count also includes the count of multiple
forward interaction between all pair of nodes.
Network All Forward First Second Third All Other Total
Type (period) Edges Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation
Chat (1 month) 1840492 441039(23.9%) 79412(4.3%) 32128(1.7%) 46969(2.6%) 599548(32.6%)
Trade (9 months) 520861 74137(14.23%) 11850(2.3%) 3766(0.72%) 47056(9.0%) 136809(26.3%)
Trust (9 months) 62674 8452 (13.5%) 351 (0.56%) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 8083 (14.0%)
to understand how players reciprocate in various networks in
a snapshot and over time.
III. RECIPROCATION IN DIFFERENT NETWORKS
The reciprocation of a network is the ratio of forward edges
(say from player a to b) that have a corresponding backward
edge (from player b to a), i.e., the ratio of mutual interactions.
A. Barriers of Reciprocation
Barriers of reciprocation can be broadly grouped in to risk
and utility. The risk factors include loosing an asset, in-game
points, or in-game time; and the utility includes, immediate
gains in terms of points and assets and long term future
prospects. Each network has specific characteristics that lead
to low, medium or high barriers for reciprocation.
The trust network yields direct access to a player’s house.
This is the highest level of barrier as the other person can
enter, add, and remove assets from a player’s house. In the
case of trade network, coin and items are exchanged between
the players on a pre-specified contract, so the barrier is having
sufficient items or coins for trade. The resulting risk involved is
nill with immediate utility for both players. Such networks fall
in to medium barrier category. In the chat network players are
at no risk and there is minimal cost to reciprocation, so these
networks fall in to the low barrier group. For the purposes of
this paper, we limit ourselves to one example for each group
for our analysis.
B. Multiple reciprocations
There can be several overlapping forward and backward
arcs between each pair of players. For the purpose of mea-
suring the reciprocation and response time, we first partition
the timeline into several partitions. We consider the start
time of first forward edge and the corresponding end time of
the first response as the first partition. Similarly, the second
forward arc and its response marks the end of the second
partition and so on. This notion of partitions of the timeline
is illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows the forward arcs
above the timeline arrow (dashed line) and backward arcs
(reciprocations) below the timeline arrow. For remainder of
this paper, unless specified, we always refer to the overall
reciprocation rate. In Table II we show multiple reciprocation
rate for two different networks.
C. Reciprocation in Trust Network
The trust network is a high barrier reciprocation network
as players have to trust each other in terms of granting house
access. It consists of several levels of access permission:
Trustee, Friend, Visitor, None, and Remove. As we see in Table
End of  
Time 
Beginning  
of Time 
Partition 1 Partition 2 Partition 3 
Fig. 3: The timeline showing the first, second, and third
partitions used for computing the response times for first,
second, and third interactions.
I, the percentage of edges that belong to the Trustee category
accounts for more than 50% and some categories, like None,
are rarely used. Also the dominant transition is from other
permissions to Trustee and most of these permissions remain in
Trustee state until the end of the observation period. For these
reasons, we assume that there are only two major permission
categories in the trust network: Trust and Not-Trust. The Trust
level corresponds to being a Trustee. We collapse the lower
trust levels, (Freind, Visitor, None, and Remove), to a single
Not-Trust level. As the lower level permissions are equivalent
to having no relationship at all, we consider absence of an
edge as the Not-Trust state. In essence, we focus only on the
Trustee level of access and all the other links are as equivalent
to having no access at all.
In the trust network, 14.0% of the forward trust (8803
one-way) links receive a trust response (reciprocation) back
and their response time distribution is shown Figure 4a. We
study the response time between the reciprocations and see
how quickly and in what volume these reciprocations happen
using the response time distribution. We analyze the entire
graph edge wise for this purpose. If an edge occurs from node
i to j at time t1, then we will account for the start time of
that edge as t1. If the reciprocation occurs from node j to i at
time t2 then the response time is computed as t2− t1. All the
forward edges from i to j between t1 to t2 are subsumed by the
first forward edge, until a reciprocation response is received
by i from j. We then use this data to draw the distribution of
response times. The x-axis denotes the time to reciprocate and
y-axis corresponds to the number of reciprocations. We find
that the response time distribution follows a power law, with
a mean response time of 27 days.
We also measured the number of player who waited indef-
initely for a response back from the other player until the end
of observation period. Surprisingly, 68.54% of players waited
indefinitely, while the remaining 8.16% of players switched
from Trust to Not-Trust state as they did not receive a Trust
response. This indicates that around 69% of players in the trust
network show patience.
The users, in the trust network, can move from Trust to
Not-Trust state and at a later date they can again establish a
new Trust relationship. As this network has an unique feature
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Fig. 4: The response time distribution for the three networks. The average response time for trust network is the highest among
chat, trade and trust.
of canceling the edges, we wish to study the reciprocation
of granting trust, followed by cancellation. We measure the
number players who initiate a revocation of housing permis-
sion and the number players who reciprocated by a similar
action. From the 8803 reciprocated links 1062 (12.1%) of
them initiated a reduction of housing access to their peer
player and 207 players out of 1062 (19.4%) reciprocated back
with a revocation response. About 80% of the players who
received a cancel request never responded back and ignored
the request. This again confirms that when a reciprocation
relationship has high barriers, an established mutual trust is
quite stable to cancellation from one-side. Also, the players
seem to respond to trust requests with a mean response time
of 27 days compared to a cancellation request of 32 days.
This suggests that the players pay more attention to granting
requests compared to canceling requests, as establishing trust
is a more preferred social activity than losing it.
D. Reciprocation in Chat,Trade and Trust Networks
In this section, we study the reciprocation behavior in chat
and trade as independent homogenous networks. Then, in the
next section, we analyze the interactions of chat and trade
relationships in affecting the reciprocation of trust network.
The chat and trade networks have simple edge types with no
attributes except time stamps.
We summarize the total reciprocation for each network type
in Table II. As the chat network is a low barrier network, it
has the highest amount of reciprocation with 32.6% of forward
edges reciprocated. The low barrier in this network is due
to the instant nature of the communication and minimal risk
involved in making a chat reciprocation. On contrary, in the
medium barrier trade network the reciprocation rate is 26.3%,
lower than chat but more than the trust network. There several
reasons why a player may not reciprocate in this network,
it could be either lack of resources or a need for doing so.
Further, we wish to analyze the response time distributions
of these networks to understand some key questions, such as,
does all reciprocations occur within a certain number of days
or are they spread uniformly over a longer period of time?
Figure 4b shows the response time distribution, which
roughly follows a power law. There is an outlier region around
45 days. We investigated this region and found that these are
first time users who are not familiar with the system. We note
that such users are extremely rare in the dataset (less than
0.01%). The figure also shows that most of the users in the
low barrier, chat network reciprocate within the same day or at
most the next day. This is evident since the mean first response
time in the chat network is less than one day (0.317). In the
chat network there is a sharp truncation [20] after 7 days, as the
significance of a message beyond a week becomes completely
irrelevant to the context of the game.
For the trade network, we show the response time distribu-
tion in Figure 4c; the distribution has a heavy tail and seems
to follow a power law. The slope of this distribution is not as
steep as for the chat network, implying the trade reciprocation
is not as quick as in chat. As the barrier for reciprocation in
the trade network is more than chat, the average response time
in trade is 43X slower at around 13 days.
IV. RECIPROCATION IN HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS
We will now overlay the trust, chat, and trade networks
to analyze the interactions among heterogeneous edges. As
the chat data is available only for a month, we restrict the
other data sets also to this one month period. Every pair of
players in this network have several edges between them with
time stamps for each edge denoting when the edge occurred.
For the trust network we consider the TRUST and NOT-
TRUST edges. The focus of this section is to answer questions,
such as: How many times does a trust granting from player
a to b result in a trust reciprocation from b to a? Does a
player b prefer to reciprocate with trade or some other low
barrier interaction such as chat before granting a high barrier
relationship such as trust to player a. The first interaction,
as noted earlier in Figure 4b, captures all the characteristics
of the additional interactions, hence we consider only the first
interaction for this experiment. For each forward edge type, we
count the number of first reciprocation between pairs of players
in the consolidated network. In the case of tie reciprocations
across multiple edge types we include all the tied edges while
counting. We have summarized the reciprocations for each
forward interaction type in Table III.
As we see from Table III, the players who perform chat pre-
dominantly make a reciprocation using the chat link (26.48%).
The main reason for this is that a chat relationship is a low
barrier relationship, which can be established between two
players instantly and does not require high degree of trust.
TABLE III: The reciprocation counts for first interaction (first
forward request and first reply) in a heterogeneous MMOG
network for a period of one month. The forward edge count
includes only the first forward edge between any pair of nodes.
The reciprocation captures the first type of response (chat,
trade or trust) to the forward edge.
Forward First Forward Chat Trade Trust
Type Edges Reciprocation Reciprocation Reciprocation
Chat 1645623 435758 1187 105
Trade 74428 7953 11402 335
Trust 10502 907 1016 722
For this reason, players do not hesitate to reciprocate a chat
response as the amount of cost involved is insignificant and
the utilities are never worse off. This observation justifies
the theory of rational selfishness [21], whereby it is in the
best interest of the player to reciprocate to a chat request to
maximize his/her utilities. The same observation is made for
the trade relationship, which is also a low barrier relationship
(but higher than chat). Here also we find that trade responses
are the predominant type of responses for a trade relationship.
This is in line with bargaining theory [22] where bilateral
parties who often negotiate a successful deal tend offer favors
to each other again. However,this is not the same in the case
of a trust forward edge type as it is a high barrier relationship
and a more time consuming activity. So people are very careful
before reciprocating for such activities and reciprocations are
first initialized through low barrier activities before recipro-
cating with a high barrier relationship, such as trust. The
reciprocations for trust forward edge is predominantly through
chat (8.63%) or trade (9.67%).
We now analyze the dependency between trust interactions
against trade and chat interactions. Recall that trade is often a
high barrier relationship whereas chat and trade are instanta-
neous and hence have a low barrier. The aim of this experiment
is to quantify how chat and trade, low barrier relationships,
influence reciprocation in a high barriermrelationship.
For any two nodes a and b in the trust network, we start
our analysis from the time when a forward TRUST edge from
a to b is established. For such a forward edge there can either
be a TRUST reply to complete the TRUST relationship or no
TRUST reply (incomplete TRUST relationship). The TRUST
relationship is determined as incomplete if there is no trust
response from b to a within the average trust response time
which is 4.6 days in this case. In other words, we truncate the
response time for the incomplete reciprocations by the mean
response time (4.6 days) and use only the period before this
mean response time for further analysis. There can also be
several other responses (low barrier interactions) from b to a
before b replies with a TRUST link. Understanding these other
relationships, such as chat and trade, before a TRUST reply
is formed from b to a is crucial to decipher the nature of
socialization required for a healthy mutual trust relationship.
From Table IV we can infer that complete and incomplete
TRUST rows differ from each other in terms of chat and trade
responses. We can see that the responses are exactly in an
opposite order in the two rows. For the complete TRUST
we observe that there were 743 forwards edges that were
responded back with TRUST. However, before the TRUST is
completed between a and b, we see that there are 408 trade
responses from b to a. These trade responses account for nearly
63% of the total responses. We have only 243 chat responses
from b to a , which is comparatively smaller than the trade
responses. Surprisingly, the amount of low barrier responses
for the incomplete TRUST gets completely reversed. There
are 9145 forward TRUST edges which do not get a TRUST
reply back and remain one sided. For these TRUST requests
from a to b, we find that the chat responses from b to a are
now 6962 (approximately 75% of the total responses) while
the trade responses are significantly lower (as low as 25 %).
This experiment confirms that a TRUST relationship be-
tween a and b is more likely to complete if there are more trade
responses than chat responses from b. This interesting result
can be used to infer the future TRUST relationships based on
some low barrier relationships such as chat and trade.
TABLE IV: The effect of low barrier relationships on high
barrier relationship (TRUST). This tables shows the connection
between chat and trade reciprocation counts and completion or
incompletion of trust reciprocation.
TRUST Forward Chat Trade
Type Edges Responses Responses
Complete 743 243 (37%) 408 (63%)
Incomplete 9145 6962 (75%) 2331 (25%)
V. PREDICTING TRUST RECIPROCATION
In this section we evaluate how well can we predict a
high barrier relationship, such as a trust, using information
about the medium barrier relationships between the nodes.
The empirical analysis in the previous section showed that the
success (completion) of high barrier trust relationship depends
on some medium barrier relationship like trade. We use this
as our motivation to quantify how well the medium barrier
relationship can help to predict high barrier relationship com-
pletion. However, we use the entire 9 months of data in order
to make any conclusions for the trust reciprocation prediction.
The chat relationship has to be excluded from this experiment
because of its limited availability for a single month. But
we add several other features to make the experiment more
interesting.
For the trust network data for 9 months, there are a
total of 61006 trust requests (forwards edges). The trust links
that are reciprocated is 8252 whereas 52574 forwards edges
remained incomplete. For the forward requests, we ignored
the requests that started in the last (9th) month because it
is hard to determine whether the requests were completed.
Thus the number of trust requests are slightly lesser than
those mentioned in earlier sections. So the completed trust link
(reciprocated) forms one class and the incomplete trust links
(unreciprocated) forms the second class. Now that we have
two classes, we construct several features in order to build a
prediction model. The following features will be used to build
prediction models.
Features from high barrier relationship(trust): This set
of features are built using the structural properties of the trust
network. These features characterize the position of players
(nodes) in the trust network. For the reciprocation links (A,B)
TABLE V: Table comparing reciprocation prediction accuracy
using different feature sets. Here K denotes the time window
starting from the time when an initial trust link was established
between two nodes.
Average Average
Classifier CWA AUC Precision Recall F-measure
only trust 0.515 0.659 0.800 0.863 0.806
trust+trade(K=0) 0.526 0.637 0.825 0.866 0.816
trust+homophily 0.519 0.604 0.788 0.849 0.808
trust+trade(K=0)+homophily 0.527 0.636 0.826 0.866 0.817
trust+trade(K=20) 0.588 0.714 0.871 0.885 0.851
we consider two structural features. The first structural feature
describes the connectivity of A to other nodes in a trust
network. The second structural feature is the connectivity of
B with other nodes in the trust network. For convenience, we
refer these features as “trust” features.
Features from medium barrier relationship(trade): This
feature set consists of features from three sub-categories
namely, structural, past-behavioral and future-behavioral. For a
link (A,B) the structural feature corresponds to the degree of
A and degree of B in the trade network. The past-behavioral
features for a link (A,B) correspond to the count of the trade
interaction of the type A to B and B to A before the trust
request from A to B started. This feature takes into account the
trade behavior between A and B before any trust interaction
started between them. The future-behavioral features takes into
account the behavior of trade interaction between A and B
once the trust request is sent from A to B. Here we use a
time window K (in days) starting from the time when trust
request was initiated from A to B. We count the number of
trade interactions in this time window K.
Features from player demography(homophily): In this
feature set we take into account the two types of homophilies.
The first type of homophily is gender homophily. The gender
homophily between A and B is 1 if A and B has the same
gender, and 0 otherwise.
The second demographic feature is the experience ho-
mophily between A and B. It is computed as X(A,B) =
X(A)−X(B), where, X(A) is the experience level of A.
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this experiment is to
quantitatively compare the impact of using different features
(described above). In the previous section we hypothesized
that the success of trust reciprocation (completion) can be
determined by the amount of medium barrier interactions
between player A and B. Thus to validate this hypothesis,
we conduct several experiments using different set of features.
Table V compares the trust reciprocation accuracy for
various feature sets. The addition of trade features boosts
the performance of the predictive model over the case when
no trade features are used. All the feature values for this
experiment are computed using the values before the trust
request was initialted between A and B. Thus we do not take
into account the impact of future time window (K) in this
experiment. The class weighted accuracy (CWA) is highest in
case when all the features are used. However, the difference
between the CWA using trust and homophily and all features
is not very significant. This trend can be observed over all the
accuracy measures. However column 2 of the table shows that
the AUC measures are higher when using only trust features
and AUC drops slightly as we include the trade features.
Since this table by itself is not sufficient to draw concrete
conclusions, we extend this experiment to include the variation
of future time window size (K) for all features and monitor its
impact in term of accuracy of the prediction model. Figure 5
shows the results of this experiment. As mentioned earlier, we
study the impact of varying the time windows size (from 0 to
25 days) for all the features. In the previous experiment, we
considered the features values without any time window (K=0).
As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 1, using trade as an additional
feature in the prediction model outperforms the model which
uses only trust or trust and homophily only. The performance
of the model with trade features with trust and/or homophily)
increase as we increase the size of the time windows from 0
to 25. We also find that addition of homophily features do not
have a significant impact in predicting reciprocation in trust
network. This is an interesting finding for trust reciprocation
prediction because it is a general notion that homophily is
significant in predicting trust links [23]. A possible explanation
of this observation is that the reciprocation phenomenon is sig-
nificantly different from a normal trust formation phenomenon.
As we know, in reciprocation there is already a one sided
relationship established and a reciprocation might depend on
entirely other dynamics such as trade interactions.
In Figure 1, the AUC for the prediction model with trade
features actually increase as we increase the time window size
(K). Thus this experiment confirms that using trade features
boosts the performance of the prediction model for predicting
trust reciprocations. One of the reasons why performance of
prediction model keeps on increasing as the time window (K)
is increased is due to the fact that players start doing other
activities such as trade once a player has initiated a trust
request. So the trade activity increases after the trust is initiated
by any player and the trust activity pattern helps to discriminate
whether a trust reciprocation will happen or not.
In conclusion, the experimental results confirms our hy-
pothesis that trust reciprocation is significantly improved by
incorporating features from other heterogeneous networks such
as trade over. We also found that using homophily features
does not necessarily improve the accuracy in trust reciproca-
tion prediction. This makes trust reciprocation a all together
different phenomenon from trust link formation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Understanding reciprocation in networks is important in
several fields from computational social science to sociology.
In this paper, we have extensively studied various social
factors affecting reciprocation in three different interaction
networks from Sony EverQuest II MMOG. These networks
vary in trust levels, interaction type and sparsity and give a
broad perspective of how players reciprocate across a vari-
ety of networks. We established the connection between the
trust level required to establish a connection inversely affects
the number of reciprocations. We also, using response time
analysis, show that people are slow in building mutual high
trust relationships compared to low trust ones. We also show
that in high trust networks player patience plays a key role
in reciprocation. We extend our analysis from single-type
networks to heterogeneous networks, where we confirm that
high degree of socialization is crucial for reciprocation in high
trust relationships.
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Fig. 5: Comparing class weighted accuracy, F1 measure, precision, and recall for trust reciprocation prediction. Here K is the
size of time window from the formation of intial trust link between the nodes. The prediction accuracy increases by incorporating
trade interactions after the intial trust link was formed. This figure shows that trade features are more significant once a initial
trust link is established between two nodes.
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